KOFA's decision on default powers
KOFA case 2023/230 concerned a procurement of a framework agreement for the purchase of snow removal vehicles for airports. The complainant argued that there was a default due to delay and that the client had failed to enforce this. The complainant therefore argued that the contract had been significantly changed and that the client, by failing to enforce, had made an illegal direct procurement.
The Complaints Board begins the assessment with some general considerations about the client’s scope of action. The Board states that as “long as the principle of equal treatment is maintained, a client must have a certain leeway” related to the enforcement of default (paragraph 71). The Complaints Board further states that this particularly applies in cases of delay where there is no quantitative change in the delivery. The prerequisite, however, is that the enforcement takes place within the framework of the procurement rules’ amendment rules.
In this case, the parties agreed that there was a delay. The question was whether the delay had been sufficiently followed up. As a general starting point, the Complaints Board states that the client must have a “wide discretion” in the factual assessment of whether the contract’s default powers can be used. As always, however, the exercise of discretion must not be arbitrary, unreasonable or in violation of the principles of equal treatment and predictability. When the client in this case had assessed that there was no basis for using default sanctions and this assessment appeared defensible, there was no inadequate enforcement of the contract. Thus, there was no illegal direct procurement. Central to the Board’s decision seems to be that the client had not simply accepted the supplier’s delays, but assessed whether default powers were applicable and actively followed up the delivery.
In KOFA case 2023/236 on the procurement of asylum reception centers with transit places, it was also argued that the client had made an illegal direct procurement by failing to follow up the supplier’s default. The alleged default was whether a temporary use permit satisfied the contract’s requirement to have “all necessary public permits”. The Board interpreted the contract in such a way that this was sufficient and that there was therefore no contract breach. The client’s scope of action in following up default was therefore not put to the test.